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1ST. GEORGE TUCKER’S SECOND AMENDMENT: 
DECONSTRUCTING “THE TRUE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY” 
 
Stephen P. Halbrook1
A bill of rights may be considered, not only as intended to give law, and 
assign limits to a government about to be established, but as giving 
information to the people.  By reducing speculative truths to fundamental 
laws, every man of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his 
own rights, and know when they are violated . . . . 
 – St. George Tucker2
Introduction 
The Bill of Rights, according to the above view, is designed to inform ordinary 
citizens of their rights.  Its meaning is not a monopoly of the governmental entities whose 
powers it was intended to limit.  By knowing when one’s rights are violated, the citizen 
may signify his or her displeasure through mechanisms such as the ballot box and the 
jury box, and may resort to speech, the press, assembly, and petition to denounce the evil.  
The Second Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms”3 was intended to 
serve as the ultimate check which the Founders hoped would dissuade persons at the 
helm of state from seeking to establish tyranny.4
1Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Va.; Ph.D. Florida State University, J.D. Georgetown 
University; former philosophy professor, Tuskegee University, Howard University, 
George Mason University.  Books include The Founders’ Second Amendment 
(forthcoming); That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right 
(1984, 2000); A Right to Bear Arms: State & Federal Bills of Rights & Constitutional 
Guarantees (1989); Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, & the Right to Bear Arms 
(1998); Firearms Law Deskbook (2006).  Argued Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997), and other Supreme Court cases.  See further www.stephenhalbrook.com. Error! 
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 2St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ed. app. at 308 (William Young Birch & Abraham 
Small, 1803) [hereafter Tucker, View of the Constitution]. 
 3“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. Const., Amend. II. 
 4This view was expressed just ten days after Madison proposed the Bill of Rights 
in Congress: 
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may 
attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally 
raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of 
2While humble people generally think that they are among “the people,” a segment 
of the not-so-humble appear to disagree when it comes to the right of “the people” to 
keep and bear arms.5 Did the Founders mean what they seem to have said, or were their 
words too complex for the common people to understand?  The following seeks to 
provide some insights into that question through an examination of the writings of St. 
George Tucker and a recent reevaluation of those writings. 
 When Thomas Jefferson was elected as President of the United States in 1801, 
students from the College of William and Mary celebrated with a glass of wine at the 
house of their acclaimed professor, Judge St. George Tucker.6 Tucker was already at 
work writing what would be the first and foremost treatise on the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights.  Published in 1803 and known as Tucker’s Blackstone, the work included the 
English jurist’s Commentaries along with Tucker’s reflections on the American system.7
During the American Revolution, Tucker had smuggled in arms from the West 
Indies at the behest of Governor Patrick Henry,8 and as a militia colonel fought against 
British forces.9 After the war, Tucker practiced law.  Tucker, along with James Madison 
 
their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their 
right to keep and bear their private arms. 
A Pennsylvanian [Tench Coxe], “Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution,” Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789, at 2, col. 1.  See S. Halbrook & D. 
Kopel, “Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823,” 7 William & 
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Issue 2, 347, 367 (Feb. 1999). 
 5“Half (50%) of the American population wrongly believe the Constitution gives 
every citizen the right to own a handgun.”  The American Public’s Knowledge of the U.S. 
Constitution (The Hearst Corp. 1987), at 27 (emphasis added). 
 6Mary Haldane Coleman, St. George Tucker: Citizen of No Mean City 
(Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938), 127. 
 7Tucker’s Appendix, “the first disquisition upon the character and interpretation 
of the Federal Constitution, as well as upon its origin and true nature,” was for years used 
as a textbook in Virginia and other states in the early republic.  J. Randolph Tucker, The 
Judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 Va. L. Reg. 789, 793-94 (1896).  See 
Stephen P. Halbrook, “St. George Tucker: The American Blackstone,” 32 Virginia Bar 
News 45 (Feb. 1984). 
 8In 1775, Tucker had heard Patrick Henry’s famous “Liberty or Death” speech, 
and left one of only two detailed accounts of that debate.  Tyler Moses, Patrick Henry,
l37 (1887, reprinted New York, 1980). 
 9Coleman, St. George Tucker, supra note 6, at 35, 48-58.  Tucker was appointed 
major of the Chesterfield militia, which he led to join General Greene in North Carolina. 
With sword and pistol, he dashed about on his horse Hob at the Battle of Guilford Court 
House, rallying the wavering militiamen and taking a bayonet wound in the leg.  Tucker 
would be promoted to lieutenant colonel of a troop of horsemen in the Virginia militia, 
3and Edmund Randolph, was appointed to the Annapolis Convention of 1786, a warmup 
for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which framed the federal Constitution. 
However, Tucker was known to have joined with George Mason and Patrick Henry in 
opposing its adoption without a bill of rights.10 In l788, as the States debated the 
proposed federal constitution, Tucker was appointed judge of the General Court of 
Virginia.  After serving in the Court of Appeals of Virginia,11 in 1813 he was appointed 
by President James Madison as U.S. District Judge for the District of Virginia.12 
In 2006, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William and Mary College of 
Law held a symposium on the influence of St. George Tucker on American law.13 
Professor Saul Cornell of Ohio State University presented a paper on Tucker’s views on 
the right to bear arms.14 As Cornell notes, “St. George Tucker described the Second 
Amendment as ‘the true palladium of liberty.’”15 
As the first major commentator on the Constitution, Tucker’s views should be 
accorded close scrutiny,16 particularly on an issue like the Second Amendment, which has 
received little attention by the Supreme Court.17 Professor Cornell has emerged as 
 
and was actively involved in the siege of Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered.   
Halbrook, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 7, at 46-47. 
 10Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 14, 1787, in 12 Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
287 (1961). 
 11Nine volumes of Virginia Reports (vols. 8-16) include opinions by Judge 
Tucker.  
 12“Biography of the Judges,” 4 Virginia Reports (4 Call.) xxviii (1827). 
 13Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium: St. George Tucker and His 
Influence on American Law, 47 W. & M. L. Rev. (Feb. 2006). 
 14Saul Cornell, “St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original 
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings,” 47 W. & M. L. Rev. 1123 (Feb. 2006) 
[hereafter Cornell, “St. George Tucker.”]. 
 15Id. at 1123.  See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 300. 
 16The Supreme Court has cited Tucker in over forty cases.  D. Kopel, “The 
Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century,” Bringham Young U. L. Rev., No. 4, 
1359, 1376 (1998). 
 17“Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States 
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 83 L. Ed. 1206, 59 S. Ct. 816 (1939) . . . . The Court did not, 
however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right protected by the 
Second Amendment.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Only in recent years has the Second Amendment been accorded detailed 
scrutiny by the federal courts of appeals.  Compare United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 
203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Second Amendment “protects the rights of individuals, 
including those not then actually a member of any militia . . ., to privately possess and 
4perhaps the leading exponent of the view that the Second Amendment recognizes no 
individual right to possess arms, and instead protects a civic duty to bear arms in the 
militia.18 Accordingly, an analysis of Tucker’s views on the issue reveals much of 
importance on the Second Amendment, and an analysis of Cornell’s views on Tucker 
may well reveal much about the position that the Amendment eschews any individual 
right. 
 In his article, Cornell seeks to refute “supporters of gun rights” who misinterpret 
Tucker as espousing that “the right to bear arms was originally understood to protect an 
individual right to keep and use firearms for personal self-defense, hunting, and any other 
lawful activity.”19 Referring to the controversy over “gun rights and gun control,” 
Cornell avers: “The individual rights misreading of Tucker is merely the latest example 
of how constitutional scholarship has been hijacked for ideological purposes in this bitter 
debate.”20 
I.  “THE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY”: 
TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE VERSUS CORNELL’S TUCKER 
Debunking the individual-rights “hijackers” of the Second Amendment, Professor 
Cornell refers to “the often-quoted passage describing it [the Second Amendment] as the 
‘palladium of liberty’” at least five times,21 but strangely fails to provide the actual 
quotation or to acknowledge its contents.  It would be worthwhile to do so at the outset in 
order to determine the extent of the constitutional hijacking by scholars who read the 
Second Amendment as protecting individual rights. 
 After quoting the text of the Amendment, Tucker began as follows: 
 
bear their own firearms”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002), with Silveira v. Lockyer,
312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting “the ‘collective rights’ model, [which] 
asserts that the Second Amendment right to ‘bear arms’ guarantees the right of the people 
to maintain effective state militias, but does not provide any type of individual right to 
own or possess weapons.”), pet. for reh. denied, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).  
 18Cornell is the Director of the Second Amendment Research Center, which is 
located at the John Glenn Institute, Ohio State University.  According to the Freedom 
States Alliance, a firearm prohibition lobby, Cornell’s new book “blows away the NRA 
myths about the Second Amendment.”  (E-mail solicitation from 
info@freedomstatesalliance.com, Sept. 19, 2006).  See Saul Cornell, A Well Regulated 
Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006).   
 19Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1123. 
 20Id. at 1124. 
 21Id. at 1123-25, 1137, 1143. 
5This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. . . . The right of 
self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the 
study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible.  
Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, 
liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.22 
Cornell’s thesis is that Tucker, along with the Founders in general, saw the 
Second Amendment as guaranteeing a “state right” to maintain a militia, excluding an 
individual right to have and carry arms for self defense, which the legislature is free to 
curtail or prohibit.  Yet Tucker’s comment clearly espouses the view that the Second 
Amendment protects the individual right to bear arms and to use them for self defense – 
“the first law of nature.” 
 The militia was not mentioned in the above quotation, although Tucker certainly 
saw the militia as the republican alternative to a standing army.  After all, the right to 
arms for defense extended to protection from both individual criminals and public 
tyranny. 
 Moreover, as noted, Tucker saw any prohibition on the right “under any colour or 
pretext whatsoever” as dangerous to liberty. He proceeded to explain further: 
In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious 
pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the 
landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though 
calculated for very different purposes.  True it is, their bill of rights seems 
at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is 
confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and 
degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun 
or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior 
tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game.  So that not one man 
in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a 
penalty.23 
22Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 300.  The above is similar to 
Tucker’s style in explaining, a few pages earlier, the freedom of the press protected by 
the First Amendment as follows: 
[A] representative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public 
functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their 
constituents; and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained 
in any manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any 
public measure, or upon the conduct of those who may advise or execute 
it. 
Id. at 297.  The above was quoted in the seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).  Justice Black 
found in Tucker’s work “the general view held when the First Amendment was adopted 
and ever since.”  Id. at 296. 
 23Id.
6Thus, when explaining how the right to keep and bear arms was violated in 
England, Tucker pointed in part to English game laws which prohibited individuals from 
keeping guns, even at home.24 He said nothing about any laws which disarmed militias.  
This is inconsistent with Cornell’s thesis that the right to bear arms protects only militias 
from being disarmed. 
 Tucker also referred above to the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, which 
stated:  “That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defense 
suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by Law.”25 This was a right of Protestant 
“Subjects” – not militiamen – to “have Arms for their Defense,” and Tucker referred to 
this above as the English variety of “the right of bearing arms” without imposing any 
militia context. 
 Blackstone had written that “a reason oftener meant, than avowed, by the makers 
of forest or game laws” was “for preventing of popular insurrections and resistance to the 
government, by disarming the bulk of the people.”26 Historically, conquerors who 
founded the European kingdoms endeavored “to keep the rustici or natives of the country 
. . . in as low a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms.  
Nothing could do this more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting . . . .”27 
Feudal laws thus “prohibit[ed] the rustici in general from carrying arms” and severely 
proscribed hunting.28 
Commenting on Blackstone’s text, Tucker again juxtaposed the limited right to 
have arms under the English Declaration with the game laws.  “In the construction of 
these game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is not qualified according to law 
to kill game, hath any right to keep a gun in his house.”29 Since only persons with an 
income of 100 pounds per annum were qualified to hunt, “it follows that no others can 
keep a gun for their defense; so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and left at 
the mercy of the government, under the pretext of preserving the breed of hares and 
partridges, for the exclusive use of the independent country gentlemen.”30 Tucker 
 
24While English games laws were in some cases enforced in a manner to prevent 
subjects from keeping guns, English judicial precedents actually held that the people at 
large could keep arms at home, and that guns could be seized only when actually being 
used contrary to the hunting prohibitions.  See Rex v. Gardner, 7 Mod. 279, 87 Eng. Rep. 
1240 (K.B. 1739), and other cases analyzed in Stephen Halbrook, That Every Man Be 
Armed, 51-53 (1984). 
 25An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, 
c.2 (1689). 
 262 Blackstone, Commentaries *412 (Tucker ed.). 
 27Id. at *413. 
 28Id.
29Id. at *414 n.3. 
 30Id.
7concluded: “In America we may reasonably hope that the people will never cease to 
regard the right of keeping and bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty.”31 
Again, Tucker discussed the right to keep and bear arms as protecting the liberty 
to keep a gun for defense in the home and to carry arms, including for hunting.  No 
mention was made of state militia powers or bearing arms in a militia.  Cornell disregards 
the above passages altogether. 
 While declining to quote the words of Tucker’s “palladium of liberty” text, 
Cornell notes that Justice Joseph Story used the same allegory in his Commentaries on 
the Constitution. Cornell states: “While individual rights scholars have often cited Story 
in modern Second Amendment scholarship, they have studiously avoided examining his 
own analysis of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.”32 Cornell 
proceeds to quote a comment by Story regarding Congress’ militia power being 
“concurrent with that of the states.”33 
As with Tucker, Cornell studiously avoids mention of the content of Story’s 
analysis of the Second Amendment, much less does he quote any of Story’s “palladium 
of liberty” statement.  Story’s interpretation is unmistakable: 
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, 
as the palladium of the liberties of the republic; since it offers a strong 
moral check against usurpation and arbitrary power of the rulers; and will 
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the 
people to resist and triumph over them.34 
Story cited Tucker for that proposition as well as for the following about the right 
of subjects “to have arms for their defense” under the English Declaration of Rights: “But 
under various pretenses the effect of this provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at 
present in England more nominal than real, as a defensive privilege.”35 Story was 
referring to possession of arms by individuals, not by militias.  While Story also stressed 
the importance of a well regulated militia, that was hardly inconsistent with the individual 
right to have arms.36 
31Id.
32Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1131. 
 33Id.
343 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1890, at 746 (1833), citing, inter 
alia, 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 300.  “Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will 
have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that 
the right to bear arms ‘has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a 
republic.’”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
 35Id. § 1891, at 747. 
 36Elsewhere Story fused the individual right with the need for a militia quite 
neatly as follows: “One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their 
purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it an offence to keep 
8Having left the reader in the dark about what Tucker and Story actually said on 
“the palladium of liberty,” Cornell asserts that for both: “Protection of states’ rights, not 
individual rights, was the issue that had prompted the inclusion of the Second 
Amendment.”37 Aside from the constitutional vocabulary that governments (federal and 
State) have only “powers” and not “rights,” and that only individuals have “rights,”38 the 
Second Amendment was prompted by the perceived need to protect the right of 
individuals to keep and bear arms, which would encourage a well regulated militia. 
 
II.  A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ARMS FOR SELF DEFENSE? 
Blackstone’s Commentaries analyzed the right to have arms in the first chapter, 
entitled “Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,” of the first book, entitled “Of the Rights 
of Persons.”  Therein he referred to “auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which 
serve principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great 
and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”39 
Besides the right to petition, Blackstone included among these auxiliary rights the 
following: 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subjects, that I shall at present 
mention, is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition 
and degree, and such as are allowed by law.  Which is also declared by the 
same statute 1 W. & M. st.2 c.2 [the Declaration of Rights], and it is 
indeed, a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of 
resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws 
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.40 
To the above, Tucker counterposed the following: “The right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.  Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this 
without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British 
government.”41 Cornell refers to this statement of Tucker, but fails to quote it, and 
 
arms, and by substituting a regular army in the stead of a resort to the militia.”  Story, A
Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Harper, 1859, 
reprint Regnery 1986), § 450, at 319. 
 37Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1132. 
 38Compare, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, and Amend. X (federal and State 
“powers”) with Amends. I, II, IV, and IX (“rights” of the people). 
 391 Blackstone, Commentaries *140-41 (Tucker ed.). 
 40Id. at *143-44. 
 41Id. at *143 n.40.  Tucker referred to the Second Amendment as Article 4 of the 
Amendments because that was the original numbering Congress used when submitting 
the amendments to the States for ratification. 
9asserts that it does “not address the question of individual self defense.”42 Yet the 
discussion concerns a “right of the subjects” to use arms for “self-preservation” when the 
law is inadequate, and no mention is made of the militia.  Indeed, Tucker added the 
following further note to Blackstone’s above words: 
Whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the British code, will 
readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away 
from the people of England. The commentator himself informs us, Vol. II, 
p. 412, “that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistence to 
government by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason oftener meant 
than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws.”43 
Again, the forest and game laws repressed the right of individuals to keep arms, in 
order to enable the ruling monarchy to control the commoners.  Such laws had no 
applicability to “State’s rights” to maintain a militia – indeed, England had no States – or 
to bearing arms in a militia.  Tucker clearly saw the Second Amendment as prohibiting 
infringements on the individual right to have arms. 
 Contending that the right to have arms in the English Declaration had no self-
defense component, Cornell argues that this auxiliary right, “‘the right to have arms,’ was 
aimed at preventing the violence of oppression, not defending oneself against thieves.”44 
But Blackstone made no distinction between defense against robbers or tyrants, nor did 
he limit defense to organized groups and exclude individual defense.  Indeed, the right of 
having arms vindicated the rights to “personal security” and “personal liberty.”  As 
Blackstone further explained: 
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently 
termed, the liberties of Englishmen. . . . And, lastly, to vindicate these 
rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are 
entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of 
justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and 
parliament for redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and 
using arms for self-preservation and defense.45 
Use of arms “for self-preservation and defense” could be individual or in a group, 
large or small.  An aggressor could be a single murderer or a renegade military force that 
stages a coup d’ état and overthrew the constitution.  Contrary to Cornell, Blackstone did 
not limit self-preservation to some kind of elusive collective right and eschew individual 
defense. 
 Tucker made further references to infringement of the individual right to bear 
arms which Cornell fails to mention.  Tucker explained how the British Parliament would 
violate basic rights in the guise of some necessary objective, but that Congress had no 
such power.  He reiterated that in England the game laws “have been converted into the 
 
42Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1146. 
 431 Blackstone, Commentaries *143 n.41.
44Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1146. 
 451 Blackstone, Commentaries *143-44. 
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means of disarming the body of the people,” and that “the acts directing the mode of 
petitioning parliament, and those for prohibiting riots: and for suppressing assemblies of 
free-masons, are so many ways for preventing public meetings of the people to deliberate 
upon the public, or national concerns.”  By contrast, Congress had “no power to regulate, 
or interfere with the domestic concerns, or police of any state,” “nor will the constitution 
permit any prohibition of arms to the people; or of peaceable assemblies by them for the 
purposes whatsoever, and in any number, whenever they may see occasion.”46 
In short, the Bill of Rights precluded “any” ban on arms “to the people” or of their 
peaceable assemblies.  Tucker wrote “the people,” not “the militia,” and he obviously had 
in mind the rights protected by the First and Second Amendments. 
 The pattern is pervasive.  Cornell argues that Tucker, in his discussion of the law 
of treason, sharply contrasted “the common law right to keep or carry firearms and the 
constitutional right to bear arms” in a militia.47 Regarding the law of treason in England, 
Sir Matthew Hale observed in Pleas of the Crown that “the very use of weapons by such 
an assembly, without the king’s licence, unless in some lawful and special cases, carries a 
terror with it, and a presumption of warlike force, &c.”48 Tucker commented that “the 
bare circumstance of having arms, therefore, of itself, creates a presumption of warlike 
force in England, and may be given in evidence there, to prove quo animo the people are 
assembled.”49 Cornell acknowledges that statement, but then avoids any reference to 
what Tucker proceeded to ask: 
But ought that circumstance of itself, to create any such presumption in 
America, where the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the 
constitution itself?  In many parts of the United States, a man no more 
thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion, without his rifle or 
musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman without his sword by 
his side.50 
As usual, Cornell avoids the embarrassing quotations.  As an example of exercise 
of “the right to bear arms” as “secured in the constitution,” Tucker referred to a man 
“going out of his house on any occasion” – not just for a militia muster – with “his rifle 
or musket in his hand.”  Cornell’s veiled reference to the above two sentences revises 
them to say that, in Tucker’s view, “the mere fact of traveling armed with a musket did 
not by itself create any presumption of illegality.”51 
46Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 315-16. 
 47Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1147. 
 48St. George Tucker, Concerning Treason, in 5 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES, ed. app. at 19. 
 49Id.
50Id.
51Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1148-49 & n.152. 
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Cornell intersperses with the above a discussion of the prosecutions arising out of 
the Whisky and Fries rebellions.  Cornell states: “The defense and prosecution in the 
resulting cases conceded that traveling armed with militia weapons did not enjoy 
constitutional protection when those weapons were used outside of the context of militia-
related activity.”52 He cites a trio of reported cases for that proposition, but nothing in 
these cases remotely makes any such suggestion.  In one case, the Attorney General did 
argue the unremarkable proposition that “to assemble in a body, armed and arrayed, for 
some treasonable purpose, is an act of levying war.”53 But no one mentioned the 
constitutional status of traveling with militia arms, whether when on duty or not. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW: INVALIDATING INFRINGEMENTS ON  
LIBERTY OR DICTATING TO THE MILITARY COMMAND? 
Cornell’s rendition of Tucker is long on Cornell’s characterizations and citations 
to recent law review articles supporting the “collective rights” view of the Second 
Amendment, but woefully short on Tucker’s actual words.  This pattern also arises 
regarding Tucker’s views on judicial review.  Cornell claims that Tucker conjured up a 
scenario of “federal disarmament of the militia” in a discussion about whether courts 
could declare laws unconstitutional.54 
Tucker made no such mention about the militia.  In the reference cited by Cornell, 
Tucker contended that judicial review is particularly applicable to laws purportedly 
passed not under an enumerated power, but under the “necessary and proper” clause, and 
which violated Bill of Rights guarantees.  A court may declare a federal criminal law 
unconstitutional in that circumstance: 
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person from 
bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts, 
under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here contended 
for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality of 
these means.  But if congress may use any means, which they choose to 
adopt, the provision in the constitution which secures to the people the 
right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and any man imprisoned for 
bearing arms under such an act, might be without relief; because in that 
case, no court could have any power to pronounce on the necessity or 
propriety of the means adopted by congress to carry any specified power 
into complete effect.55 
52Id. at 1148 n.150, citing United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799); 
United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348 (1795); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 346 (1795). 
 53Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 26 F.Cas. 1277, 1281. 
 54Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1138, citing Tucker, View of the 
Constitution, supra note 2, at 289. 
 55Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 289.  Tucker adhered to the 
then-incipient view that the courts are duty bound to declare statutes contrary to the 
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Tucker referred above to a law prohibiting “any person” – not a militia – from 
bearing arms.  Judicial review would be initiated by “any man” imprisoned for bearing 
arms, not by a State claiming federal usurpation of its militia power or an individual 
claiming rejection by a militia force.  In short, the Second Amendment protected 
individuals from federal laws which would prohibit possession of arms and impose 
imprisonment for having arms. 
 Tucker expanded on this analysis of judicial protection for the right to keep and 
bear arms in a further passage.  Cornell refers to the page number, but neither quotes the 
passage nor summarizes its content.56 Tucker wrote: 
 If, for example, a law be passed by congress, prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions of a man’s 
own conscience; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people to assemble peaceably, or to keep and bear arms; it 
would, in any of these cases be the province of the judiciary to pronounce 
whether any such act were constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit the 
accused from any penalty which might be annexed to the breach of such 
unconstitutional act. . . . The judiciary, therefore, is that department of the 
government to whom the protection of the rights of the individual is by the 
constitution especially confided, interposing its shield between him and 
the sword of usurped authority, the darts of oppression, and the shafts of 
faction and violence.57 
The right to have arms, under the above view, was on a par with freedom of 
religion, speech, and assembly, and abridgment of any of these rights should be declared 
unconstitutional.  The judiciary had a special responsibility to protect these “rights of the 
individual.”  
 Yet Cornell, who refuses to quote the relevant passages, refers to “The modern 
individual rights misreading of Tucker,” and asserts: “The danger that Tucker 
apprehended was federal disarmament of the state militias.”58 He adds: “If Federalists 
tried to restrict the right to bear arms in the militia, Tucker believed that federal courts 
should strike down such laws as unconstitutional.”59 Yet Tucker never mentioned the 
militia in the above passages, not even once. 
 
constitution as void.  In a General Court case decided in 1793, Judge Tucker opined that 
the Virginia Constitution of 1776, being the sovereign act of the people and hence the 
supreme law, “is a rule to all departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to 
the legislature . . . .”  Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cases 20, *23 (1793).  Chief Justice John 
Marshall would espouse that view in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( l Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 56Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1138, citing Tucker, View of the 
Constitution, supra note 2, at 357. 
 57Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 357. 
 58Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1139. 
 59Id. at 1139-40. 
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As for the alleged “right to bear arms in the militia,” those conscripted into the 
militia apparently have a “right” to do that which they are ordered to do on pain of fines 
or imprisonment.  It is a rather curious “right” to do something one is forced to do.  As 
for those who are not conscripted into the militia, they have an even more radical “right” 
to be so conscripted. 
 Specifically, based on the same passage from Tucker quoted above, Cornell 
asserts that, to Tucker, “the right to bear arms in a well-regulated militia was a judicially 
enforceable privilege and immunity of federal citizenship.”60 Aside from the fact that 
Tucker did not say or even imply that, the implications of this statement are astonishing.  
It suggests that a person who is not a member of a militia could file a federal lawsuit and 
obtain a judicial decree ordering those in authority to accept such person as a militia 
member, and further ordering that such person be able to bear arms.  Could such person 
also choose which arm he or she would like to bear, as well as decide where and when to 
do so?  Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the fundamental concept of compelled 
enrollment into a military force and its system of command.  
 Tucker himself noted that the 1792 Militia Act “establishing an uniform militia 
throughout the United States, seems to have excluded all but free white men from bearing 
arms in the militia.”61 Indeed, the Act provided in part that “each and every free able-
bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of 
the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after 
excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or 
 
60Id. at 1126, citing Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 356-57.  
Cornell claims that this view was adopted by Republicans in the Department of Justice 
during Reconstruction, but only cites two works supportive of the view that 
Reconstruction Republicans held the Second Amendment to be a right of individuals, 
including freed slaves, which was incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 257-66 
(1998); Stephen P. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to 
Bear Arms, 1866-1876 viii (1998).  The Department pursued criminal indictments in 
federal courts alleging that the individual rights of freedmen to assemble and to have 
arms under the First and Second Amendments were violated by private conspirators.  See 
Halbrook, Freedmen, chapters 6-7. 
 61St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2 ST. GEORGE 
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, ed. app. at 37 n. [Hereafter Tucker, On the 
State of Slavery in Virginia.] Elsewhere, Tucker summarized the militia law in part as 
follows: 
Every able bodied white male citizen of the respective states, of the age of 
eighteen, and under forty-five years of age (except certain persons 
particularly excepted, and all persons who now are, or may be excepted by 
the laws of the respective states) shall be enrolled in the militia: and every 
person so enrolled shall, within six months, provide himself with arms, 
&c. as directed by the act, and shall appear so armed, &c. when called out 
to exercise, or into service. 
2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, 409 n.
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commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside . . . 
.”62 Even within that limited class, various occupations, from government officials to 
persons involved in crucial transportation services, were exempt from the militia.63 
According to the Cornell thesis, the persons not qualified by law to be in the 
militia by reason of age, sex, race, occupation, not being able-bodied, or simply not being 
needed had a judicially-enforceable right under the Second Amendment to enlist in the 
militia so that they could “bear arms.”  The above statutory limitations presumably 
should have been declared unconstitutional by the courts.   
 Moreover, the Act also required every person enrolled in the militia to “provide 
himself with a good musket or firelock” and other equipment, and required him to 
“appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service . . 
. .”64 Yet under the Cornellian constitutional right to bear arms in the militia, one not 
called out to exercise or into service would have a judicially-enforceable right to be 
called out.  Such person would also presumably have the right to decide what kind of 
arms to bear, even if contrary to what the law and the militia command prescribes. 
 In short, Cornell is so intent on deconstructing the ordinary reading of the Second 
Amendment – that the people have a right to keep and bear arms – that he conjures up the 
unprecedented fantasy that a federal court could dictate to military authorities, including 
the personnel of a militia force together with their functions and arms.  Reality was and 
remains otherwise.  A militiaman’s refusal to peel potatoes when so commanded because 
he felt entitled to “bear arms” would be insubordination, not exercise of a constitutional 
right, and could lead to a court-martial. 
 Tucker’s views as expressed in his edition of Blackstone were originally 
formulated in Tucker’s law lectures presented at the William and Mary College of Law.  
These lectures, according to Cornell, do “not support the individual rights view,” for 
Tucker “explicitly described the Second Amendment as a right of the states . . . .”65 For 
once, Cornell presents an actual quotation from Tucker, instead of the usual snippet or 
failure to quote anything.  In this quotation, Tucker states that a State may choose “to 
incur the expence of putting arms into the Hands of its own Citizens for their defense,” 
and that would not contravene federal authority.66 To “contend that such a power would 
be dangerous” – on the basis that federal law might be resisted or withdrawal from the 
Union might occur – “would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our 
Government.”  Tucker added that this was the view of the first federal Congress, since it 
proposed what became the Second Amendment, which Tucker quotes.  “To this we may 
 
62Chap. 33, Hening, Statutes at Large, vol. 1, at 271, § 1 (1792). 
 63Id. at 272, § 2. 
 64Id. at 271, § 1. 
 65Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1125, citing Tucker, Ten 
Notebooks of William and Mary Law Lectures 126-29 (unpublished Tucker-Coleman 
Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary). 
 66Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1129-30, citing Law Lectures, 
id. at 127-28. 
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add that this power of arming the militia, is not one of those prohibited to the States by 
the Constitution, and, consequently, is reserved to them under the [Tenth 
Amendment].”67 
This statement is consistent with both the power of the state to arm its citizens – 
which is implied in both the Militia Clause of the Second Amendment and in the reserved 
powers guarantee of the Tenth Amendment –  and the right of the citizens to keep and 
bear such arms – which is explicit in the Second Amendment’s operative clause.  In 
short, the States had a reserved power to arm the militia, and this did not violate any 
power delegated to the federal government.  Contrary to Cornell, Tucker did not assert 
that the Second Amendment secures nothing more than a State militia power. 
 Tucker’s above views from his law lectures reappeared in his View of the 
Constitution which was published as an appendix to his edition of Blackstone.  The 
subject was the Militia Power in Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, which delegates power 
to Congress “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, 
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .”68 
The objective of this provision, according to Tucker, could be traced to the 
Virginia bill of rights, which declared “that a well-regulated militia, composed of the 
body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . 
. . .”69 Tucker recalled the proposed amendment by the Virginia convention that ratified 
the Constitution in 1788: “that each state respectively should have the power to provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whenever Congress shall omit or 
neglect to provide for the same.”70 (As discussed below, that provision was rejected by 
Congress when it considered amendments in 1789.)  Any “uneasiness upon the subject, 
seems to be completely removed,” Tucker continued, by the Second Amendment.  “To 
which we may add, that the power of arming the militia, not being prohibited to the 
states, respectively, by the constitution, is, consequently, reserved to them, concurrently 
with the federal government.”71 
67Id. Indeed, the Constitution was clear when it prohibited military powers to the 
States.  E.g., Art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . keep Troops . . . in time of Peace”). 
 68U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. 
 69Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 272-73, quoting Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, Art. XIII (1776). 
 70Id. at 273.  See J. Elliot ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3, at 660. 
 71Id. The focus of Tucker’s discussion was the Militia Power, not the Second 
Amendment, which was mentioned only once.  Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra 
note 2, at 272-75.  Cornell cites these same pages and claims: “This discussion of the 
Second Amendment clearly frames the issue in terms of the militia.”  Cornell, “St. 
George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1138. 
16
The above was consistent with Tucker’s other comments in the View on the 
Second Amendment.  Recognition of the right of the people to have arms promoted a 
well regulated militia.  Contrary to Cornell, the two concepts are hardly irreconcilable. 
 As noted above, the Virginia convention proposed a state power to provide for the 
militia should Congress neglect to do so.  This was among the structural amendments 
concerning federal and State powers that the convention proposed.  Virginia also 
proposed an entirely separate list of “unalienable rights,” including “that the people have 
a right to freedom of speech,” and “that the people have a right to keep and bear arms; 
that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the 
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”72 
When the first federal Congress considered amendments to the Constitution, the 
proposed bill of rights was considered separately from the structural amendments.  The 
Senate passed provisions which would become the First and Second Amendments, 
rejecting inclusion of an anti-standing army provision in the latter.73 St. George Tucker 
was informed of these Senate proceedings.74 
The Senate considered separately, and rejected, all structural amendments to the 
Constitution, including the Virginia proposal: “That each state, respectively, shall have 
the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever 
Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same . . . .”75 The linguistic differences 
are unmistakable: this posited the “power” of the “state” to organize, arm, and discipline 
its militia, in contrast with the “right” of “the people” to keep and bear arms. 
 John Randolph wrote to St. George Tucker about the Senate action as follows: “A 
majority of the Senate were for not allowing the militia arms & if two thirds had agreed it 
would have been an amendment to the Constitution.  They are afraid that the Citizens will 
stop their full career to Tyranny & Oppression.”76 
Cornell, without any reference to the Senate’s consideration of the amendment 
regarding the State militia power, mistakes Randolph’s letter as concerning the Second 
Amendment, and asserts: “As Randolph’s letter to Tucker suggests, the issue before the 
Senate was control of the militia, not an individual right to use guns for personal defense 
 
72Elliot ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution, vol. 3, at 658-59. 
 73Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 
(Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1820), 70-71. 
 74Theodorick Bland Randolph to St. George Tucker, Sept. 9, 1789, in Helen E. 
Veit et al. eds., Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First 
Federal Congress (1991), at 293. 
 75Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America, 75.
76John Randolph to St. George Tucker, Sept. 11, 1789, in Creating the Bill of 
Rights, supra note 74, at 293. 
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or hunting.”77 Yet the Senate passed the individual right to have arms and rejected the 
state power to maintain militia.  It cannot be the case that, by declaring the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms, Congress actually intended to declare the power of States 
to maintain militias – the very proposal Congress rejected. 
 The Senate then returned to the bill of rights, passing a form of the First 
Amendment similar to the final version, and rejecting a proposal to add “for the common 
defence” after “bear arms” in the Second Amendment.78 Had it succeeded, recognition of 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms for the common defense” would have still 
guaranteed an individual right to keep arms, but could have been interpreted as allowing 
arms to be borne only for the common defense. 
 Cornell denies that the Senate’s rejection of the words “bear arms for the common 
defense” “establishes that they intended to protect an individual right,” claiming that 
“Randolph’s letter casts the choice to excise this language in a radically different light.”79 
To the contrary, Senate action on the Second Amendment was entirely separate from its 
action on the State militia power, which was the subject of Randolph’s letter.80 
IV.  THE LINGUISTICS OF “BEARING ARMS”: 
DOES “BEAR” MEAN CARRY, AND DO “ARMS” INCLUDE HANDGUNS? 
Under Tucker’s above linguistic usage, the term “bear arms” simply means to 
carry a weapon, whether for defense, hunting, militia purposes, or other reasons.  
However, Cornell argues that “bear arms” had an almost exclusively military usage.81 
The evidence for this argument is underwhelming.  
 The first state bill of rights to use the terms “bear arms” was that of Pennsylvania 
in 1776, which stated: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of 
themselves, and the state . . . .”82 Cornell denies that such language denotes an individual 
 
77Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1129.  Strangely, Cornell 
describes the Senate action as a defeat, rather than a victory, for the Federalists.  Id.
78Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America, 77.
79Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1129. 
 80Cornell makes a single oblique reference to the failed State-militia-power 
amendment, yet endeavors to attribute its meaning to the Second Amendment: “Anti-
Federalists failed to obtain their primary goal of securing structural amendments to the 
Constitution that would have shifted power back to the States. . . . Although an 
amendment restricting federal control over the militia was rejected, the adoption of the 
Second Amendment was understood, at least by some, to provide some protection for the 
state militias.”  Id. at 1133. 
 81Id. at 1140-44. 
 82Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, Art. XIII (1776).  Ignoring this guarantee, 
Cornell asserts: “A few efforts had been made to incorporate this common law principle 
[to bear a gun in self-defense] into state bills of rights during the Founding Era, but those 
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right, since it did not refer to the singular “right to bear arms in defense of himself and 
the State,” as did one or more state bills of rights in the nineteenth century.83 Yet 
“defense of themselves” meant self defense, or otherwise it would redundantly mean 
defense of “the state.” 
 Moreover, Pennsylvania kept that same clause in a 1790 revision as follows: 
“That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not 
be questioned.”84 James Wilson, president of the convention which adopted that 
provision, a leading Federalist, and later Supreme Court Justice, explained it in a 
discussion of homicide “when it is necessary for the defence of one’s person or house.”85 
He continued: 
it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have seen, 
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any human institution.  
This law, however, is expressly recognised in the constitution of 
Pennsylvania.  “The right of the citizens to bear arms in the defence of 
themselves shall not be questioned.”  This is one of our many renewals of 
the Saxon regulations.  “They were bound,” says Mr. Selden, “to keep 
arms for the preservation of the kingdom, and of their own persons.”86 
Cornell argues that only “isolated examples” exist of the terms “bear arms” being 
used in an individual, non-military sense, “an idiosyncratic text such as the Dissent of the 
Pennsylvania Minority” being one example.87 That was a proposal by Anti-Federalists in 
the Pennsylvania convention that ratified the Constitution in 1787 for a bill of rights, 
including the following: 
 
efforts inevitably failed.”  Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1144.  His only 
example is that the Virginia Declaration of Rights did not include Jefferson’s proposal 
that “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms . . . .”  Thomas Jefferson, The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1950), vol. 1, at 344-45.  Actually, none of Jefferson’s draft bill of rights was 
included. 
 83Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1140-41.  The first constitution 
to use the phrase “defense of himself and the State”  was Miss. Const., Art. I, § 23 
(1817). 
 84Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI (1790). 
 85The Works of the Honourable James Wilson (Philadelphia: Lorenzo Press, 
1804), vol. 3, at 84. 
 86Id., citing “Bac. on Gov. 40.”  See Nathaniel Bacon, An Historical and Political 
Discourse of the Laws and Government of England.  Collected from some Manuscript 
Notes of John Selden, Esq. (London: D. Browne & A. Millar, 1760), vol. 1, at 40 
(“Freemen . . . were bound to keep Arms for the preservation of the Kingdom, their 
Lords, and their own persons”). 
 87Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1140 & n.103. 
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That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves 
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, 
unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from 
individuals . . . .88 
When the Bill of Rights was being debated in the House of Representatives in 
1789, Rep. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, then the Speaker of the House who had also been 
president of the Pennsylvania ratification convention, wrote that “it takes in the principal 
Amendments which our Minority had so much at Heart . . . .”89 The Second Amendment 
was merely a more concise version of the above, sans its laundry list of purposes and 
exceptions. 
 Cornell cites no proposed or adopted constitutional guarantee which limited the 
terms “bear arms” as a “right” to purely military use.  He refers to a game bill which 
Jefferson drafted and Madison proposed to the Virginia legislature in 1785.90 The bill 
provided for deer hunting seasons outside one’s enclosed land, punishing a violator with 
a fine and being bound to his good behavior.  If within a year “he shall bear a gun out of 
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty,” the defendant would be in 
violation of his recognizance.91 Since this refers to “bear[ing]” an arm when deer hunting 
or otherwise not on military duty, Cornell’s claim that “this text undermines the claims of 
individual rights theorists” is difficult to understand.   
 While ignoring Tucker’s repeated use of “bear arms” above to refer to individual 
use, Cornell points to Tucker’s work on slavery to show that “the term ‘bear arms’ was a 
legal term of art that clearly implied the use of arms in a public capacity, not a private 
one.”92 Writing in 1796, Tucker noted that free Negroes “were formerly incapable of 
serving in the militia, except as drummers or pioneers, but now I presume they are 
enrolled in the lists of those that bear arms, though formerly punishable for presuming to 
appear at a muster-field.”93 Tucker republished his essay on slavery in the Commentaries 
with new notations, including the following in regard to the comment that free blacks 
were enrolled in the militia: “This was the case under the laws of the state; but the act of 
 
88Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Merrill Jensen ed. 
(Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), vol. 2, at 623-24. 
 89Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush, Aug. 18, 1789, in Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 74, at 290. 
 90Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1141. 
 91Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd ed. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), vol. 2, at 443-44. 
 92Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1142. 
 93Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual Abolitiion 
of It, in the State of Virginia (Philadelphia 1796), at 20, citing 1723. c. 2. 
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2 Cong. c. 33, for establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States, seems to 
have excluded all but free white men from bearing arms in the militia.”94 
Despite the military assistance of free blacks and even slaves in the Revolution, 
they were deprived of civil rights, such as: “All but housekeepers, and persons residing 
upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying any gun, powder, shot, club, 
or other weapon offensive or defensive.”95 
Tucker referred above to free blacks who were enrolled on the militia lists to 
“bear arms” as well as the later exclusion of all but whites “from bearing arms in the 
militia.”  In neither instance did he limit the terms “bear arms” to militia service, and in 
the latter saw a need to specify that the bearing of arms was “in the militia.”  Tucker used 
the terms in the broadest manner in his plan for the emancipation of slaves, in which he  
proposed civil restrictions such as: “Let no Negroe or mulattoe be capable . . . of keeping, 
or bearing arms, unless authorized to do by some act of the general assembly . . . .”96 He 
explained that “by disarming them, we may calm our apprehensions of their resentments 
arising from past sufferings.”97 
Referring to the above prohibition on blacks “keeping, or bearing arms,” Cornell 
claims: “According to Tucker’s analysis, blacks would be prohibited from keeping arms 
in their home, or from appearing at muster and being issued arms they might bear as part 
of the militia.”98 Yet Tucker said nothing about any militia muster or being issued arms – 
the prohibition was on “bearing arms” in any form, which meant carrying arms in any 
manner, just as under the slave codes. 
 
94Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, supra note 61, ed. app. at 37 n. 
 95Id. at 20, citing 1748 c. 31. Edit. 1794.  Tucker also referred to the Virginia act 
of 1680, renewed in 1705 and 1792, which “prohibited slaves from carrying any club, 
staff, gun, sword, or other weapon, offensive or defensive.  This was afterwards extended 
to all Negroes, mulattoes and Indians whatsoever, with a few exceptions in favor of 
housekeepers, residents on a frontier plantation, and such as were enlisted in the militia.”  
Id. at 55.  He noted about such laws: “From this melancholy review it will appear that . . . 
even the right of personal security, has been, at times, either wholly annihilated, or 
reduced to a shadow.”  Id. at  57. 
 96Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery, supra note 93, at 93.  Tucker added in a 
footnote to the above: “See Spirit of Laws, 12, 15, 1. Blackst. Com. 417.”  In that 
passage, Blackstone relied on Montesquieu for the proposition that slaves, excluded from 
liberty, envy and hate the rest of the community, and thus warned “not to intrust those 
slaves with arms; who will then find themselves an overmatch for the freemen.”  1 
Blackstone, Commentaries 417-18 (this is in volume 2 of Tucker’s edition.).  
Montesquieu warned of “the danger of arming slaves . . . in republics.”  1 Montesquieu, 
Spirit of the Laws (Nugent transl. 1899), at 243-44. 
 97Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery, supra note 93, at 94-95 
 98Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1142. 
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In explaining the term “bear arms,” Cornell not only constricts the word “bear” to 
one narrow meaning, but also does the same with the word “arms.”  Militia weapons such 
as muskets were constitutionally protected (albeit limited to militia use), while “civilian 
firearms,” “ordinary guns,” and “personal arms such as pistols” were not.99 
However, pistols were indeed militia arms.  Officers in troops of horse were 
required by the 1792 Militia Act to “be armed with a sword and pair of pistols”100 Tucker 
himself fought in battles in the Revolution as a militia officer armed with sword and 
pistol.101 Not surprisingly, Cornell finds nothing to cite from Tucker to substantiate his 
claim. 
 Instead, Cornell quotes from an anonymous letter to the editor writing on the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 to the effect that “the legislature have [sic] a power 
to controul [arms] in all cases, except the one mentioned in the bill of rights . . . .”102 
Cornell adds, implying that he is summarizing the author: “Personal arms such as pistols 
were not treated in the same way as militia weapons such as muskets.”103 Yet the author 
said absolutely nothing about that subject.  “In the absence of any law prohibiting the 
ownership or use of personal firearms” – Cornell’s words, not the author’s – “‘the people 
still enjoy, and must continue so to do till the legislature shall think fit to interdict.’”104 
Moreover, the context of the above was the Massachusetts Constitution, which 
provided: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”105 
The above author commented elsewhere: “All men . . . have, a right to keep and bear 
arms for their common defense, to kill game, fowl, &c. . . . The [Massachusetts] Bill of 
 
99Id. at 1151. 
 100Chap. 33, Hening, Statutes at Large, vol. 1, at 271, 272, sec. 4 (1792). 
 101Halbrook, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 7, at 46-47. 
 102Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, quoting “Scribble Scrabble,” 
Cumberland Gazette (Portland, Maine), Dec. 8, 1786 (brackets added by Cornell). 
 103Id.
104Id., quoting “Scribble Scrabble,” Cumberland Gazette, Dec. 8, 1786.  Another 
author writing in the same newspaper noted: “The idea that Great Britain meant to take 
away their arms, was fresh in the minds of the people; therefore in forming a new 
government, they wisely guarded against it.”  “Senex,” Cumberland Gazette (Portland, 
Maine), Jan. 12, 1787.  This contradicts Cornell’s thesis that pistols were not 
constitutionally protected, since British General Thomas Gage confiscated pistols as well 
as other firearms from the inhabitants of Boston.  Richard Frothingham, History of the 
Siege of Boston (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1903), 95 (“the people delivered to the 
selectmen 1778 fire-arms, 634 pistols, 973 bayonets, and 38 blunderbusses”).  In the 
Declaration of Causes of Taking Up Arms of July 6, 1775, the Continental Congress 
decried Gage’s seizure of the arms of the people of Boston.  2 Worthington Chauncey 
Ford ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1779 (1905), at 151. 
 105Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Art. XVII (1780). 
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Rights secures to the people the use of arms in common defense; so that, if it be an 
alienable right, one use of arms is secured to the people against any law of the 
legislature.”106 The federal Second Amendment includes no limitation on the use of arms 
to the common defense, a clause which – as discussed above – was explicitly rejected. 
 Running far afield of Tucker, Cornell also references an 1837 Georgia law 
prohibiting sale and possession of pistols.107 He neglects to mention that the Georgia 
Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, 
explaining: 
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and 
not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such 
merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed or 
broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to 
be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so 
vitally necessary to the security of a free State.  Our opinion is, that any 
law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which 
contravenes this right.108 
That interpretation is consistent with Tucker’s remark that liberty is endangered 
where “the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, 
prohibited . . . .”109 And aside from the fact that pistols were militia arms, Tucker’s 
statements against the English game laws demonstrate that firearms in general, including 
hunting arms, were constitutionally protected.  Tucker contrasted the rights of Americans 
under the Second Amendment with England, where “the people have been disarmed, 
generally,” so that “not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house . . . .”110 
CONCLUSION 
Cornell asserts about Tucker: “His writings fit neither the modern collective nor 
individual rights models.  In his more mature writings, Tucker thus approached the right 
to bear arms as both a right of the states and as a civic right.”111 Aside from that not 
being Tucker’s approach, that is the “collective rights” model.  Denial that a “right” is 
individual necessarily implies that it is “collective.”  The ideas of a state “right” to bear 
arms and of a person’s “civic right” to bear arms in the militia are two basic variants of 
the collective rights model. 
 
106“Scribble-Scrabble,” Cumberland Gazette, Jan. 26, 1787.  
 107Cornell, “St. George Tucker,” supra note 14, at 1151 n.165, citing 1837 Ga. 
Laws 90. 
 108Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846). 
 109Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 300. 
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Having turned Tucker completely on his head, Cornell expresses indignation 
about scholars who read Tucker’s words in their literal and ordinary way: 
Far too much scholarly energy has been wasted in the great American gun 
debate trying to twist history to produce a usable past.  While both sides in 
this debate have played the law office history game on occasion, partisans 
of the individual-rights view have been far more aggressive in pushing 
their ideological agenda. . . . Reinterpreting the Second Amendment as an 
individual right does more than simply distort history for ideological 
purposes, it also does great violence to the text of the Constitution . . . .112 
While Cornell is certainly correct in adding that one cannot just erase the Militia 
Clause from the text, nor may one erase the substantive right.  Those who deny that the 
Amendment protects individual rights have failed to articulate any inconsistency between 
recognition of the right of the populace to have arms and the resultant encouragement of 
a militia. 
 The irony cannot be lost that Tucker, in his lectures at William and Mary College 
of Law, explained the ramifications of the Second Amendment as an individual right in 
detail, and that two centuries later, at the same College of Law, in a symposium dedicated 
to Tucker’s legacy, Tucker’s views on the Second Amendment are obliterated.  This is 
accomplished by repeated veiled references to “the often-quoted passage describing it 
[the Second Amendment] as the ‘palladium of liberty,’”113 without ever quoting that 
passage or any of the other rich passages in which Tucker analyzed the broad character of 
the right to keep and bear arms. 
 That brings us back to Tucker’s insight that a bill of rights is intended not only to 
instruct government on its limits, but also to “giv[e] information to the people.”  Every 
person, even the most humble, thereby “may learn his own rights, and know when they 
are violated.”114 Tucker synthesized the Founders’ aspirations in favor of a declaration of 
rights that was more than a scrap of paper.  This was the vision of the Founders as to 
every provision of the Bill of Rights, not excluding the Second Amendment. 
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